## THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS LUFKIN DIVISION

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FAMILY ONE, ET AL \* NO. 9:22-CV-28-MJT-ZJH

Lufkin, Texas

VS.

 $$^{\star}$$  11:45 a.m. - 1:40 p.m. ADAM DALE ISAACKS, ET AL  $$^{\star}$$  March 2, 2023

## MOTION HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ZACK J. HAWTHORN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Proceedings recorded by computer stenography Produced by computer-aided transcription

> Edward L. Reed 9251 Lynne Circle Orange, Texas 77630 \* 409-330-1605

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## 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 11:45 P.M. - MARCH 2, 2023 3 THE COURT: The Court calls Case No. 4 9:22-CV-28, styled Family One all the way up through 5 it looks like Family Eight, the Plaintiffs, vs. Adam 6 Isaacks, Miranda Isaacks, Little League Baseball, Inc., 7 Little League Baseball International, Texas District 12, Evadale Little League, and Bear Creek Hunting Club. 8 9 We're set this morning on various discovery and 10 Protective Order related motions. 11 Who's here for the plaintiffs? 12 MR. DAVID BERNSEN: Your Honor, David Bernsen, 13 Cade Bernsen, Marianne Laine, Tanner Franklin, and 14 Britlyn Sanders for the plaintiffs. 15 Okay. And let's see, for the THE COURT: 16 defendants? 17 Yes, Your Honor. William Fox of MR. FOX: 18 Winston & Strawn for Texas District 12 Little League 19 and Little League Baseball, Incorporated. 20 MR. ADAMS: Your Honor, Kent Adams for Evadale 21 Little League. 22 THE COURT: Okay, I guess nobody showed up for

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Okay, let's -- I'm going to approach it

Bear Creek Hunting Club or the Isaackses, so we'll go

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forward.

this way: The first motions I'm going to talk about are the Motions to Strike the Confidentiality

Designations. That's Brent Stahlnecker's deposition,

Document No. 95; Samantha Mahaffey's deposition,

Document No. 98; and Various Confidentiality

Designations, Document No. 102.

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I'm going to set the stage in this way:

I'm just going to read to the parties -- and I'm sure

they've read it, but just to make sure everybody is on

the same page, I'm going to read Binh Hoa Le vs. Exeter

Finance Corporation, 990 F.3d, 410, Fifth Circuit 2021,

and I'm just going to read some of the language from

that opinion, starting at page looks like 418.

"In our view" -- this is the Fifth Circuit talking, obviously -- "courts should be ungenerous with their discretion to seal judicial records, which plays out in two legal standards relevant here. The first standard, requiring only 'good cause', applies to Protective Orders, sealing documents produced in discovery. The second standard, a stricter balancing test, applies 'once a document is filed on the public record -- when a document becomes a judicial record.' Under both standards, the working presumption is that judicial records should not be sealed. That's why 'judges, not litigants,' must undertake a case-by-case,

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document by document, line by line, balancing of the public's common right of access against the interests favoring nondisclosure. Sealings must be explained at a level of detail that will allow for this Court's review. And a court abuses its discretion if it make's no mention of the presumption in favor of the public's access to judicial records and fails to articulate any reasons that would support sealing.

"Perhaps most disquieting, documents marked confidential" -- in this case -- "provided the basis for summary judgment -- a dispositive order adjudicating the litigants' substantive rights, yet there was no mention of the presumption in favor of the public's access to judicial records.

"At the *discovery* stage, when parties are exchanging information, a stipulated protective order under Rule 26 may well be proper. Party-agreed secrecy has its place -- for example, honoring legitimate privacy interests and facilitating the efficient exchange of information. But at the *adjudicative* stage, when materials enter the court record, the standard for shielding records from public view is far more arduous. The conflation error -- equating the standard for keeping un filed discovery confidential with the standard for placing filed materials under

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seal -- is a common one and one that over privileges secrecy and devalues transparency.

"The secrecy of judicial records, including stipulated secrecy, must be justified and weighed against the presumption of openness that can be rebutted only by compelling countervailing interests favoring non-disclosure.

"Legal arguments, and the documents underlying them, belong in the public domain. When it comes to protecting the right of access, the judge is the public interest's principal champion. And when the parties are mutually interested in secrecy, the judge is its only champion.

"With great respect, we urge litigants and our judicial colleagues to zealously guard the public's right of access to judicial records -- their judicial records -- so that justice may not be done in a corner."

Okay, so I've read the back-and-forth from the parties on the deposition excerpts and the exhibits, and the parties seem to be both correct, but they are using different standards.

So, looking at the stipulated Protective Order -- now, this is an agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants, it defines

confidential -- or excuse me, let me go to page 2, Confidentiality Designation.

"Any producing party must designate any discovery material as confidential, under the terms of this order, if such party believes reasonably and in good faith that it contains commercial, proprietary, personal, or privileged information."

Now, that is about as broad as you could possibly get in two ways:

First, anything is proprietary. Unless you are just giving somebody a blank sheet of paper, anything is proprietary. If you give the other side an email, the email address is proprietary. The fact that it's on Outlook instead of Lotus is proprietary. Anything is proprietary.

Secondly, it's a subjective standard, it's not an objective standard. So, even if it's not proprietary objectively, if that party, the producing party, reasonably and in good faith believes, if they believe that it contains that information, it must -- and the language says "must" -- designate it as confidential.

I understand why the parties, both the plaintiffs and the defendants, agree to a Protective Order. I sign these in a lot of cases. We've got a

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form Protective Order on some of the judges' tabs on the website. But this standard applies just to the exchange of information. The parties can pretty much contract whatever they want to contract to when it comes to exchanging discovery in that Protective Order.

But then that different standard applies when the documents are filed in the public domain, which is where we are right now, obviously. When that happens, the standard is -- and they didn't really set it out particularly in the Fifth Circuit opinion. They just said case-by-case, line-by-line, page-by-page. But the sound bite of it is there has to be some kind of compelling, countervailing interest to keep something sealed.

So here's my proposition -- and I'll get feedback from the parties -- is that I've looked at every single document that the plaintiffs are challenging the confidentiality designation. And I don't need to go through every single one line-by-line, page-by-page -- which I did -- to know that these very smart lawyers over here on my left can make an argument that they reasonably believe it's proprietary or personal or commercial. Commercial. I mean, you know, what's not commercial.

And so the motion that's pending before

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me by the plaintiffs is a Motion to Strike the confidentiality designation. That's what's in front of me. And so the law for that is, the Protective Order that the parties agreed to and Judge Truncale signed.

So, again, if I grant their Motion to

Strike the confidentiality designation, on what basis

would it be? Because, like I said, these lawyers are

going to be able to argue that all this information

falls within the agreed-to definition of

confidentiality.

So, with that, my impulse is to just deny the Motion to Strike and I'll give them an opportunity -- I'll give them some opportunity. If the plaintiffs have just some winning argument that there is no way there is a good faith basis that this is not proprietary, I'll give them a chance to set that forward. I'm doubtful of it, but I'll give them an opportunity.

But moving forward, and we'll talk about this, the plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal First Amended Complaint, that is under the higher Binh Hoa Le standard; okay? So we'll analyze that as to whether the defendants can point to me that those various paragraphs in that First Amended Complaint -- I know it's been superseded with the Second Amended One that

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has some redactions -- they are going to have to convince to me that there is some compelling countervailing interest to keep those portions of it sealed.

Now, to the extent that the plaintiffs or someone else argues that just by filing the Motion to Strike the confidentiality designation with the sealed attachment, then it is now in the public domain and the Binh Hoa Le standard must apply.

I understand that that's an attractive argument, but the problem with that is, is that if that were the case, then a Protective Order is not worth the piece of paper it's written on because that would just provide an end-around any Protective Order.

For example, the parties file a Title VII lawsuit, or whatever. They enter into and agreed a Protective Order, standard, whatever way you want to mention it. Defendant then produces Rule 26 disclosures, employment files, records, business information, whatever the case is. They are very open and generous with their discovery to the plaintiffs.

So all the plaintiff then needs to do is file a motion to de-designate that confidential designation under whatever grounds. And by doing that, the Binh Hoe Le standard then applies and the

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Protective Order doesn't apply, which totally circumvents the purpose of the Protective Order. It's a full and free, efficient exchange of information.

So, as it just relates to a Motion to

Strike confidentiality designation and that specific

concrete method, I don't believe that's in the public

domain, so to speak, because we're just talking about

Grist Mill Discovery Exchange, which I'm going to talk

about when it's used in an adjudicative fashion here in

a little bit.

But there really is no dispute, per se, among the parties about whether this document shows that there is some type of joint enterprise liability on behalf of Little League and District 12 and Evadale Little League and things like that. These are just basically stand-alone motions having to do with the confidentiality of the documents.

That having been said, going forward, when the parties file a motion, whether it's a response to a Motion for Summary Judgment, expert, Motion in Limine, whatever it is -- and I know the Protective Order says, if I mark this confidential, you have to file it under seal -- the way our local rules are written is, if you file a response to a Motion for Summary Judgment and a few attachments are covered

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within the Protective Order, you file those under seal, you are supposed to accompany that with a separate Motion to Seal. That's what the parties will need to do going forward.

And so if -- probably not a lot of documents on a response to a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, but let's just say that the motion recent Motion to Dismiss was a Motion for Summary Judgment. Ι assume the plaintiffs will have a response to it with a lot of attachments, probably a lot of attachments that have been marked confidential. So, according to the Protective Order, unless it's amended, they will have to file those under seal, but they will have to just go accompany that with either a Motion to Seal or a Motion to Unseal to say, "Hey, we recognize this is covered by the Protective Order, but we think, under the Fifth Circuit standard for public records, that, you know, these need to be unsealed. Then it will be up to either myself or Judge Truncale to make that ruling.

Just to give the parties a head-up where my head is at, again, I've gone through all these exhibits, all the depo excerpts, and I find that all of them don't meet the higher standard in *Binh Hoe Le*, with the exception of Ms. Mahaffey's deposition, page 160, line 2 to 161, line 22.

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So, I could be persuaded otherwise, but I'm just letting you know, all these exhibits and depo excerpts at issue, I find they are all covered by the Discovery Protective Order, but I find, except say for one, are not covered by the higher-judicial-recordshould-not-be-unsealed standard.

Okay. So that's what I plan to do. I'll get some feedback from the plaintiffs, starting with what I mentioned a few minutes ago, and that is, is there any argument from the plaintiffs that any of these documents at issue don't fall in the very broad definition of confidential information that's on page 2 of the Protective Order?

MS. LAINE: Your Honor, we don't believe all of them fit that definition. However, I can see how under the [u/i] confidential in the paragraph 3, that it could be construed that way. Actually, we've gotten to a point now where there are in the neighborhood of 33,000 documents, and so we're kind of put into the position that in normal or routine motion practice, we're scared of violating the Protective Order. It's just become unworkable because they've labeled probably, you know, 90-something percent as confidential, which by itself, that's evidence of bad faith. And in order to invoke this Protective Order,

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it has to be reasonable and in good faith. And so that is one basis of our argument, that it does not fall within the Protective Order.

I'll be honest with everybody here. When I sign a Protective Order, my eyes glaze over; okay? I try to read all of it to a "T" and say, yeah, this is a good idea or a bad idea. I used to do that when I was a younger judge and I had more energy. Now I don't have as much energy. So I just kind of say, yeah, it looks all right and I sign my name to it. I even do that much.

Order was suggested, and I don't know who suggested or brought it up. It's common sense in this case why you would have one, obviously, for the privacy interest of the plaintiffs. But it appears that the plaintiffs agreed to too much or too broad of a definition of confidential information. I don't think it's bad faith because, like I said, these lawyers -- and I've a trial with one of them -- are very smart, and they are going to be able to meet that burden to say something is commercial or is -- I mean, anything is commercial and proprietary.

Now, there is nothing that prevents the

plaintiffs -- and this is actually set forth in the Protective Order -- to file a Motion to amend it with Judge Truncale or myself, to say, you know what, it's gotten to a point now where this Protective Order is too broad, and so we want more narrow definitions going forward because we're getting 30,000 documents, 29,500 of which they have marked "confidential" and we can't litigate this case under these handcuffs. We just can't do it.

And so we need to put some modifiers in here on the definition of "confidential." And whatever modifiers you want to put in is up to you. And, of course, if there is some kind of disagreement between the parties on the definition, then that could be entertained by either Judge Truncale or myself or whomever.

But I think going forward, that's how this needs to be handled is just try to amend -- if the plaintiffs think it's took restrictive, and maybe the defendants do, too, I don't know. But if there is a feeling that if this is took broad and everything is too confidential and it's being misused, then just file a motion to amend it with the Court if it can't be agreed to. That's my suggestion.

MR. DAVID BERNSEN: Your Honor, for the

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record, David Bernsen. And we will do so. The foundation or the beginning of the Protective Order was during the Pretrial Conference when we informed the Court and defense counsel that we were dealing with very sensitive issues regarding the records of these eight young children, these boys that had been sexually abused in this case. The defendants at that time, as I recall, said, "Well, we may have some documents that may need to be confidential as well." I said that's fine and we worked through it.

And then when they produced -- when the defendants produced all these records, they summarily marked everything "confidential." Thousands, tens of thousands of those documents or pages are in the public domain. They are the rules, the rules for 2018, '19, '20, '21 and '22. And it was just an effort to mark everything that they produced under the guise that it's protected, the document, under the Protective Order.

I don't think it was good faith. That wasn't what we were talking about. We were working on a relationship at that time with -- I don't even know if present counsel was there at the time. But we were working with the defendants on that. Having been on the defense side, I've been there.

But what became apparent after each of

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the various document dumps is that they were putting that confidentiality stamp on everything. And so we've been complaining about that and going through it, trying to work with defense counsel, and it's just not manageable, to where we have to file a Motion to Seal the Motion to Unseal the documents, and it gets to the point where it isn't workable. And quite frankly and candidly, it's not in good faith. I mean, it is an effort to obscure the facts and documents that in any other case would not be confidential.

So we will take the Court's recommendation and we will be filing a Motion to Amend it because I think it's being misused and it's a tactic, if you will. The defendants will file documents in the public's record, for instance, the Motion to Dismiss, saying that plaintiffs don't have enough facts or information to state a cause of action. We then take documents from them or that have been produced that shows to the contrary what they have said in their public disclosure, that their statements are not true. And yet we have to circumvent the disclosure by sealing it or redacting it. And it's very frustrating and it's unfair.

And so I hear what the Court is saying concerning the lawyers that we have here on this side

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of the table. We'll address that. But it's -- they are using it as a sword and a shield, this confidentiality, and I think misusing it to their -- or trying to use it to their advantage and our disadvantage. And that's what our frustration is in terms of the documents, or for that matter even the depositions.

THE COURT: Okay, but here's what I'm saying,
Mr. Bernsen, is I'm saying everything that I've looked
at, save for that one exception, it doesn't meet the
standard. When they mark confidential, that's the
standard. I think it's confidential under the
Protective Order. I don't think it's confidential when
it's in the public domain.

there is not a Motion to Unseal -- and I'm not talking about the confidential designations. So, when you respond to that Motion for Summary Judgment, or whatever it is, and all 25 of your exhibits are filed under seal, okay, because they all have that stamp on it and that's what you have to do under a Protective Order as written, file a Motion to Unseal and say, "Look, this is the Binh Hoa Le case. The public has a right to know. There is no compelling necessity to keep this sealed," and they'll have an opportunity to

1 And then Judge Truncale and myself are guided 2 by the what the Fifth Circuit has said in that case; 3 okay? 4 So it might be a problem because it's 5 tedious, but this is what y'all have agreed to and this is what I have to enforce, unless there is an amended 6 7 order. 8 MR. DAVID BERNSEN: All right, Judge. 9 All right. Any response from the THE COURT: defendants? 10 11 MR. ADAMS: Your Honor, Kent Adams for Evadale 12 Little League. May I introduce someone to the Court. 13 This is his first time here. William Fox is a partner 14 with Winston & Strawn, he's a graduate of the 15 University of Virginia, undergrad at Duke University 16 Law School, and he's worked for a Texas Supreme Court 17 Judge and a Northern District of Texas Federal Judge. 18 I just wanted to introduce him to the Court since he 19 hasn't been here, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. All right, Mr. Fox, any 21 response? 22 MR. FOX: Yes, Judge, thank you for the 23 quidance. 24 And thank you for the introduction, 25 Mr. Adams.

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We do not believe that we have ever acted in bad faith in this case. And the example that I will provide the Court, I believe, crystallizes that -- and we will get into it, I'm sure, in a moment -- is the also pending Motion to Unseal the Amended Complaint.

As Mr. Bernsen had said, there is material in that pleading that came from documents that had confidentiality designations on them.

THE COURT: Okay, let's just talk about that now. I'm not accusing anybody of bad faith, but let's segue into Document 112 now, and that's the Motion to Unseal.

So tell me, Mr. Fox, the compelling countervailing interests of keeping paragraphs 109, first sentence, third sentence; 111, 113, 114, 115 sealed from the public.

MR. FOX: Yes, Judge. May I go back to the table and pick up my --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. FOX: So I'll start off by saying that we recognize that the standard for sealing something, sealing a public record, is higher than the Protective Order standard. We have to overcome the presumption of public access to court records. This was announced by the Supreme Court in the Nixon case that we cite and

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the Apple case from the Federal Circuit and the Binh

Hoe Le case in the Fifth Circuit and the Trover case

from the Eastern District of Texas. The Nixon case

and the Apple case both recognize that one of the

situations in which the presumption is overcome is when

the document to be sealed contains sensitive business

information.

[Audio problem developed, after which a recess is taken and the proceedings resumed as follows:]

THE COURT: Mr. Fox, if you can go back to the podium.

MR. FOX: Thank you, Judge.

I believe where I left off is that I was contending that the two categories of information in which these six paragraphs fall, they fall into the sensitive business information category, and within that there are two different categories that we have discussed in our briefing. One of them is information about internal budget deliberations of Little League Baseball, and the second category is internal deliberations about policies and procedures, mainly draft policies and procedures.

Mr. Stahlnecker's declaration that we attached to Docket 144 discusses both of those things and explains why these categories of information are

Wsensitive.

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With regard to paragraph 109, which contains the internal budgetary information, he says, "Disclosing Little League's internal deliberations regarding budget allocations, including about safety related issues, would harm Little League's competitive standing by, for example, disadvantaging Little League in negotiations with current and potential vendors who would not otherwise know what internal budget allocations Little League makes and who could use the disclosed information to secure more favorable financial arrangements with Little League, that is, financial arrangements less favorable to Little League.

THE COURT: So how does Mr. Stahlnecker think he's going to be able to try this case? I mean, this is going to come up at trial. I mean, I've read the stuff about Samantha Mahaffey back and forth: "I was only given this and, it was denied, I wanted more, we spent this, but they only allocated this."

If this case is going to be a trial, it's going to come up, and a trial was public, last I checked. So is he going to suggest the Court just close its courtroom and kick everybody out because they are talking about Samantha Mahaffey's budget?

MR. FOX: Well, that's the position that we

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are taking now. We don't believe that the entire trial --

THE COURT: How is it going to change? How is it not going to be non-internal deliberations at trial? I mean, like the character of this is not going to change at trial, as it is now. It's still business information or whatever Mr. Stahlnecker thinks. But, I mean, we try cases here in Lufkin and my guess is this is going to come out, probably in opening statements, I would assume, because I keep hearing so much about it according to the documents back and forth. And Motions to Dismiss and all that kind of stuff, not just this.

But I think Little League Baseball needs to keep the end in mind to know that unless this case settles or it's disposed of otherwise, all this is coming out at trial.

MR. FOX: Well, the answer to that, Your Honor, honestly, just depends on how you rule under the Binh Hoa standard and on this issue. Because we are now contending that this meets the standard given the evidence in the record, Mr. Stahlnecker's declaration. If this same limited information were to be discussed at trial, appropriate procedures would have to be taken to seal the courtroom for those parts.

The next category of information is the

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internal deliberations regarding non-final policies and procedures. Mr. Stahlnecker states regarding that category:

"Disclosing incomplete accounts of internal discussions about proposed or non-final changes to Little League's policies will harm Little League's competitive standing by diminishing Little League's ability to recruit Little League participants and volunteers by creating confusion and misimpressions

So I don't have much more to say about this, Your Honor. I believe the question comes down simply to whether you believe this evidence that I have just discussed meets the standard. We contend that it does. I believe it was in the *Trover* case that similar declarations were submitted and they did it there.

So that's all I have for you on that.

about the content of Little League's policies."

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal the First Amended

Complaint. I don't think the paragraphs at issue meet

21 the standard set forth in Binh Hoa Le and Holy Land

22 | Foundation, and so I'm going to grant the motion now.

It's not before me and I kind of glanced

24 at it, but the Second Amended Complaint -- help me out,

25 | plaintiffs -- there were some redactions. Again, there

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is not a Motion to Unseal, but it doesn't make much sense for me to unseal these particular portions of the First Amended Complaint, but not do the same to the Second Amended Complaint. MS. LAINE: Okay. So, in the Second Amended Complaint, I can tell you that paragraphs 118, 120, 122, 123 and 124, these were the same -- they are the same standard that was in the First Amended Complaint. THE COURT: Okay. And so we can file another --MS. LAINE: Again, there is not an active THE COURT: motion, but I don't like redacted information on the docket. MS. LAINE: I agree with that. THE COURT: Unless it's a birthday or Social Security number or minor plaintiff's name or something that's quite obvious. But something that just a party doesn't want to get out in the public domain shouldn't just be redacted. MS. LAINE: So we will file a Motion to Unseal and --THE COURT: Right, unredact. File a motion to file an unredacted. MS. LAINE: Unredacted copy of the First Amended Complaint?

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1 Yes, right, that's correct. 2 Y'all will have an opportunity to be 3 heard, you know, the defendants. It can be opposed or 4 unopposed and you can respond and say, no, those 5 paragraphs are different or Hawthorn was wrong or 6 whatever, that's fine. I don't care. 7 Yes, Judge. MR. FOX: 8 Okay. All right. Anything from THE COURT: 9 you, Mr. Adams? 10 No, Your Honor. MR. ADAMS: 11 All right. I might forget about THE COURT: you, so if you need something, just stand up and let me 12 13 know. 14 I just want to blend in the --MR. ADAMS: 15 Okay, if you want to have a seat, THE COURT: 16 okay. 17 So let's go to the Motions to All right. 18 We'll start with the first one. That's Docket Quash. 19 Entry 76. Let me get to it real guick. 20 Mr. Fox, if you want to come to the 21 podium, I'll address you first on this. 22 All right. So this is a deposition by 23 written questions geared towards, from what I understand, the insurance brokers of certain entities 24 25 that Little League uses for insurance and defendants

want to quash it under the standard boilerplate objection language. Plaintiffs claim they need it to refute or to advance their theories of vicarious liability and joint enterprise, but something is sticking out to me on this.

On some of these policies, Mr. Fox, the description of the insured says the district administrators. So, in the Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and throughout this litigation, you know, Little League Baseball is trying to position itself to say: We're not vicariously liable for what happens at the local level because we have no -- I can't remember the phraseology -- direct control over the manners, methods, and means.

And so the plaintiffs are obviously trying to refute that and say: No, you do. And in fact, you are writing insurance for -- and this is where my question is. It says Business Description. I'm just going to document 79-2, page 5. It says the named insured is Corporation, that's Little League Baseball, Incorporated, and the business description is District Administrators. So who are we insuring with this policy right here?

MR. FOX: The District Administrators are additional insureds.

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MR. FOX:

THE COURT: Okay. And are we talking about Ms. Roebuck, District Administrator, or people with Little League in Williamsport? Like who are the District Administrators. MR. FOX: So, within the Little League framework, you have Little League Baseball, That is a federally chartered Incorporated. It's in Pennsylvania. They have some organization. 100 -- a couple of hundred employees around there. They also have some employees located in other places. The hierarchy below that are districts, and these are regional entities that are separate entities from Little League Baseball, Incorporated. this lawsuit they are District 12 --THE COURT: You said separate? MR. FOX: Yes, sir. Okay, how separate? So they are THE COURT: insuring people they are separate from? I mean, I don't insure strangers down the street. I don't insure my next door neighbor. I insured my kids. But you see this is why the plaintiffs want this information; You're saying they are separate, but you're writing policies or paying for policies in which there are additional insureds.

So this is set up so that these

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other entities can get insurance. THE COURT: Okay. So the District -- now, District Administrators, is Jennifer Roebuck somebody who's an additional insured under this policy? District 12 got sued. I don't think she got -- she didn't get sued individually? MR. FOX: Correct. THE COURT: But let's just say, for argument's sake, she got sued individually. Would she be insured under this policy or is that a difference layer of District Administrator? MR. FOX: My understanding is that these policies cover the districts themselves. THE COURT: Okay, District 12? MR. FOX: Yes. THE COURT: All right. So, according to this policy, Little League is insuring District 12. And I'm not getting into your business, but you are here also representing District 12; are you not? MR. FOX: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. So I would just assume, not to get into your business, but an insurance company may or may not have hired y'all to represent under the same policy? Well, don't answer that. I don't want to

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1 get into your business. Don't answer that. 2 ahead, you were going to say something before that. 3 MR. FOX: I was going to answer the question. Okay. Well, you can answer it. 4 THE COURT: 5 So the insurance policy that applies MR. FOX: 6 to District 12 in this case is not the same insurance 7 policy that applies to Little League Baseball in this 8 case. 9 All right. But they are THE COURT: 10 additional insureds? And I know -- I'm going through 11 these documents and like there are separate premiums 12 for each. 13 Okay, so going back now, just to make sure 14 I'm clear, the District Administrators are people who 15 work -- like would she -- would Jennifer Roebuck be an 16 additional insured under this policy, under District 17 Administrator? MR. ADAMS: Your Honor, the reason I'm 18 19 interested in this is because my client, Evadale Little 20 League, is part of the same insurance program. 2.1 Little League Baseball has their own insurance, as 22 Mr. Fox points out. But it also has created a portal 2.3 for District 12, for example, and Evadale Little League, to require insurance, as well as a service to 24 25 those entities. And as we understand it, the officers,

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the board members, the regional, the District Administrators and so forth are additional insureds under those policies, if that answers the Court's question. THE COURT: All right. MR. FOX: So what may not have been clear is that there are different policies. Like there is a policy for District 12 on which District 12 is the additional insured. That does not provide coverage of Little League Baseball and District 12 at the same time. THE COURT: Well, it says the named insured and -- hold on. It says: Named insured and mailing address, Little League Baseball -- I'm on the wrong page, okay, sorry. On Document 79-2, page 5, it says: insured and mailing address, Little League Baseball, Incorporated, South Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Business description: District Administrators. So that's a different policy? I'm unclear. MR. CADE BERNSEN: Your Honor --THE COURT: Wait, Mr. Bernsen, Mr. Younger Bernsen. No.

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MR. CADE BERNSEN: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

1 Your Honor, now, are you looking MR. ADAMS: 2 at plaintiffs' request --I'm reading an attachment to the 3 THE COURT: 4 motion -- Defendant Little League's Motion to Quash 5 And so this is an attachment to that, subpoenas. 6 Exhibit D. 7 Hold on, hold on. No, I misspoke, Document 79 -- I'm sorry. 8 Mr. Adams, sorry. 9 the Plaintiffs' response to the motion -- the Motion 10 for Protection from the deposition by written And so plaintiffs are attaching this 11 questions. 12 document to show, "Hey, you know, they are fighting us 13 tooth and nail about joint enterprise liability and 14 vicarious liability, but we've got this document in 15 which both District Administrators and Little League, 16 Incorporated are listed on the same policy when they 17 are telling us in their Motion to Dismiss that, no, 18 these are separate deals, we don't have any control 19 over them." 20 I'm just reading from an attachment that 21 the plaintiffs filed. 22 MR. FOX: Okay. So, Your Honor, to get to, I 23 believe, what the point of our motion is, is that we have argued that these are overbroad subpoenas and 24 25 request irrelevant information. In their response

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plaintiffs have articulated a narrow theory of relevance, but these requests go beyond that theory of relevance. They say, for example, "Produce applications and documents submitted in connection with obtaining insurance for the following policy." That's not limited in any way. And then it says in that same sentence for other ones, and I'm looking at 76-3, page 10 of 29, right now. And then if you go back to 76-1, page 5 of 19, it says, "Produce any and all materials pertaining to the underwriting decision, risk selection, and pricing for following policy of insurance." And it asks that about several policies of insurance. If you go to 76-2, page 5 of 19, again, it asks, "Please produce any and all materials pertaining to the underwriting decision, risk selection, and pricing for the following policies of insurance."

So, just to take one thing, the legal standards that they have to meet to show respondent superior vicarious liability, for example, they have to prove control over the details of the work of the servant, the person they are contending is the servant, for ratification.

And another of their theories of

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liability, they have to prove that Little League Baseball knowingly accepted the benefit of some wrongful conduct. For joint enterprise, they have to show a community of pecuniary interests and among other things, an equal right to control the enterprise of the putative enterprise members. So just the mere fact that Little League may be providing a means for districts or local leagues to purchase insurance, there may be some aspects that are relevant to that, but the point of our motion is that these requests go far beyond that. The theory of relevance that they propose does not match the scope of these requests. THE COURT: So what can they request from Lexington Insurance Company? MR. FOX: Well, they have requested nothing from Lexington Insurance Company at this point. THE COURT: Okay. MR. FOX: These subpoenas are directed to Keystone Risk --Yeah, okay. What can they request THE COURT: from Keystone Risk Managers, LLC? MR. FOX: I don't -- I'm hesitant to come up with the language of a request for them, but I would

imagine it ought to be tailored to the elements of

their theories in some respect.

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THE COURT: Well, that's kind of why we're here, you know. Their theory is -- we've already talked about it -- joint enterprise, ratification, vicarious liability. And, you know, they want to know, what is Little League going to their insurance broker with to say, "Hey, we want a policy for our District Administrators. We want a policy for us."

And so the insurance company, when they make their underwriting decision, is going to respond and say, "Okay, so how many District Administrators are we additionally insuring? Is it five people or 5,000?" Like they are going to have some questions, you know, to answer.

And so, you know, what the plaintiffs are trying to get at to refute or to help -- I don't want to put words in their mouth -- vicarious liability is to say, "Hey, they spent X number of dollars or they presented to their insurance broker that they want insurance for, you know, a thousand District Administrators."

So, of course, you know, District 12 is under the control, management, and direction of Little League Baseball because they provided insurance for them. Or maybe it might be the fact that, no, we're

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just talking about four people. You know, I don't know, I don't know what's in there.

But, you know, just dealing with insurance personally with this job is insurance companies want a lot of information from you before they assume that obligation to insure the insureds. They want to know how old your house is, how old the roof is, the wind storm certificate, the contents, slab, foundation, how far it is from a fire station. Like it's a pretty exhaustive questionnaire, and that's just for a house. These are policies that are multi-million dollar liability policies.

So I guess what I'm coming at you with is why shouldn't they -- why isn't it relevant to a claim and defense? Your defense is there is not vicarious liability. Their claim is there is. And so one way to show that is the level of control especially when it comes to providing insurance for local District Administrators or Little Leagues.

What's your response to that?

MR. FOX: Well, the mere fact that the entities have insurance that is through Little League in some way is not enough on its own to events control. We cited case law --

THE COURT: You're just arguing the merits to

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control?

I'm not granting oral arguments for the Motion to But, I mean, it does. I mean, if I provide Dismiss. insurance to someone in this -- if somebody is an additional insured on my policy in this courtroom, there has got to be some kind of special relationship It just is. And it may come out that there is I don't know. But being able to provide insurance or assisting the obtaining of insurance is relevant to whether there was control or not control; true or false? Our position is false because that MR. FOX: the legal standard that they have to meet is that: Sufficient control over a person, plaintiffs must make it" -- I'm reading from our motion just to give you the legal standard, Judge. THE COURT: Right. They have to show that Little League MR. FOX: controlled the progress, details, and methods of another's work. That's not mere -- like your outcome of this job has to be X. For this type of relationship to obtain, there has to be this extensive level of control under the law. And, you know, we just don't think --

THE COURT: And insuring someone is not a

Purchasing insurance for somebody is

1 not a level of control? 2 MR. FOX: Well, no, in the context of Little 3 League Baseball --THE COURT: Well, let me ask it this way: 4 5 Isn't it true that you won't charter a local Little 6 League if they don't have insurance either through the 7 risk pool that Little League offers or their own 8 private insurance? They will say you are not going to 9 get your charter if you don't have insurance. 10 MR. FOX: I believe so. 11 Okay. So we know that Little THE COURT: 12 League controls the patch; right? You don't get your 13 patch unless you have insurance, whether it's 14 through our pooling agreement or through your own 15 private agreement. 16 Plus, if the local Little League does get 17 private insurance, they have to submit those documents 18 up to headquarters and they have to approve them; 19 correct? True or not true? 20 MR. FOX: Uh-huh. 21 All right. Okay, I've heard THE COURT: 22 enough on this. 2.3 [Pause] 24 Let's move on to -- okay, the bank 25 records, that's Document No. 93. Okay, these are

1 District 12's Capital One Bank records. 2 MR. FOX: And in addition to that, they are 3 records from an accounting firm called Blackburn, Meek, 4 Maxey, I think. 5 Okay. THE COURT: Do you want to argue on 6 this, Mr. Fox? 7 Yes, Judge. MR. FOX: 8 So, again, our argument here is that 9 these requests are again overbroad and requesting 10 irrelevant information. They request from Capital One, 11 for example -- and there are three different ones of 12 Capital One. I'll just give you examples from one of 13 them. 14 "Please produce any and all documents 15 relating to all bank accounts in the name of Texas 16 District 12 Little League for the period including, but 17 not limited to January 1, 2012 to the present." 18 The second one asks for all bank 19 statements during this same period; all cancelled 20 checks during the same period; all deposits, slips, and 21 receipts from the same period; all check registers from 22 the same period. And the list goes on. 2.3 And in plaintiff's response they again propose a narrow theory of liability related to this 24

alleged relationship between local leagues, districts,

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and Little League Baseball.

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Again, these broad requests go far beyond that theory of relevance. They do not request merely transactions among these entities, or records in which District 12 interacted with the local league or with Little League. They request absolutely everything from this time period.

I mean, I thought District 12 was just set up for basically the supervisor, for lack of a better term, of 16 Little Leagues. Did they have another carpentry business that they were doing or something? Like I thought District 12 was just set up to supervise and maintain, you know, these local 16 leagues or whatever. Like what else is District 12 into that's not related to Little League?

MR. FOX: Well, so the main set of expenditures that District -- well, Texas District 12 Little League has is that they have a district level tournament every year.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FOX: And that is the thing that they spend money on. In addition to that, if umpires, if people like Jennifer Roebuck or Melissa Riedinger need to travel to go to trainings of variation kinds, they

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will pay for those things. But the point is that there are expenses that District 12 incurs that are District 12's expenses. THE COURT: Okay. And what's the problem with I mean, they are a defendant. that? MR. FOX: I'm sorry, what's the problem with what? THE COURT: I mean, what's the problem with getting access to what District 12 is spending their money on? They are a defendant in this case. And if they are, you know, spending money on fields for Evadale Little League, isn't that relevant to show some type of, you know, control between District 12 and Evadale Little League? Well, first of all, just to be clear, these are directed at Capital One, it's not directed at District -- I know District 12 is the subject, but they are not asking District 12 to produce these. They are not asking your clients to produce these records. are asking Capital One to do it. According to the plaintiff, they say Capital One is ready and willing to provide all these documents. Plaintiffs have to pay for it, which is probably going to be expensive. But anyway, the whole unduly burdensome and all those arguments, like, if somebody asks me to

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provide my last 10 years check registers and expenses, that would be a real pain for me to do that. If they want to ask my bank to do it, hey, that's fine, have at it.

But, you know, again, without glossing over it, the biggest point of contention thus far in this litigation is Adam Isaacks did these bad things to these kids; okay? Little League Baseball did not. And Little League Baseball has no kind of control over Adam Isaacks, his wife, Evadale Little League, District 12, okay, none of that. And so what the plaintiffs are trying to push back on is, no, there is. There is some type of cooperation. There is a joint enterprise between the local Little League, the coaches, and Little League Baseball.

So what the plaintiffs want is they want to know -- you know, they always say follow the money. So I think Ms. Roebuck said they charged \$2.00 per player for the local little Leagues to District 12. So what was that money, you know, spent on? Did it flow back to District 12 or did that go up to Little League Baseball?

So, like Inn of Court, for instance, for our dues we have to pay a certain amount to Inn of Court National, the American Inns of Court, whatever

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that is, even though we're a local charter. you've got kids who are playing Little League Baseball, they are paying -- I don't know if the discovery bears I assume it's the case. A certain amount of money that they pay to Evadale Little League or whatever goes towards Little League Baseball. So I guess my point is, why isn't it relevant, I mean, where the money is flowing back and forth? My argument is the same, Your Honor. MR. FOX: They could have had requests that are tailored to that theory of relevance. For example, they could have asked for documents pertaining to transactions between District 12 and local leagues. They could have asked for documents related to local leagues just in some But they have not limited their requests in any way whatsoever. THE COURT: Can they request documents from District 12 to Little League Baseball, like how much is District 12 paying Little League Baseball? MR. FOX: Not in these subpoenas. THE COURT: I mean, like District 12, I would assume, is either getting money from Little League or paying money to Little League; right? Do you think?

I mean, I saw a document here that Tyler

County Little League is paying -- I think it said, 1 2 "Please remit payment to," and it's little League 3 Baseball in Williamsport. 4 MR. FOX: Well, the local leagues --5 THE COURT: Right. 6 MR. FOX: -- ves --7 THE COURT: Okay. -- pay dues to Little League 8 MR. FOX: 9 Baseball. 10 THE COURT: Sure. And does that flow through 11 District 12? 12 MR. FOX: It's not through the district. 13 like that, it's not through the district. 14 Okay. So Tyler County Little THE COURT: League pays - writes a check, not to District 12, but 15 16 it pays a check to Williamsport --17 Little League Baseball. MR. FOX: 18 THE COURT: -- Little League Baseball? 19 MR. FOX: So that is separate from this two 20 dollar assessment that District 12 started asking the 2.1 local leagues for in recent years. Little League 22 Baseball does not fund the districts. They are largely 2.3 on their own when it comes to gathering funds to put on this baseball tournament that I mentioned and to cover 24 their other expenses. District 12 is staffed by local

volunteers, just like a local league would be.

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And to answer your question from a moment ago, Your Honor, when you asked about whether they have requested -- and my understanding was had have they requested this subpoena, documents specifically related to transfers between Little League and District 12, or even local leagues and District 12, while I would agree that these requests encompass those things, they also go beyond them, requesting other things as well.

THE COURT: Any response from the plaintiffs?

MR. DAVID BERNSEN: Yes, Your Honor. For the record, David Bernsen.

For the first Motion to Quash, which is Document 76, which is the underwriting, there is a bit of confusion, I think, on this side of the table. The premiums for District 12, whatever the structure is, are paid by Little League Baseball, Incorporated, period.

The problem that we have -- and the Court is right on it -- is that one of their big positions has been they are all autonomous, they are separate, they are not related in any form or manner.

The policy, that document the Court was reading, has the named insured as Little League

Baseball, Incorporated. In the beginning there was a

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question whether or not it was Little League Baseball, Inc., was the proper defendant Little League Baseball International, Incorporated. And we had to fight through those issues. I think they have conceded finally, the defendant has, that it's Little League Baseball, Incorporated.

But the way this policy declaration reads, it says the named insurance is Little League Baseball Incorporated. The named insured is corporation and the business description is District Administrators.

Under the structure, there's Williamsport, then there are regional offices, then there are District Administrators. We have sued District 12 because of all the confusion, but it may be that -- and I'm not sure that the answer was given, but I think it will be in these documents -- is it the District Administrator, themself individually, or is it the District 12 in each of the various states.

But the underwriting will have all of that. It will have this is our business, this is how we're doing it, this is how we proposed you to write us insurance. But it will have that information and it goes to that issue as to the structure itself of Little League Baseball.

The liability issues, it impacts that as

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well, but it goes to, which we think is wrong, that it's one and the same, that they are all tied together. And so it's certainly relevant and material, and we should have an opportunity to get that information. That's with regard to the underwriting. The finances of District 12, it's all supposed to be about baseball. So we just said just give us your bank records as to who you are writing checks to, where the income is from. And the truth of the matter is, is that the District 12 -- well, anyway, it ties into the same issues as to the relationship of District 12 to Little League Baseball, Incorporated, the relationship of the District 12 to Evadale, and what they are spending money for and where they are getting money. And that's something that goes to that one issue, as to the structure of the defendants, as well as to the extended issue of the liability. I think the Court spoke of that, but that's why we think we're entitled to it because it's

I think the Court spoke of that, but that's why we think we're entitled to it because it's all relevant material, certainly because of the issues raised by the defendants.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. DAVID BERNSEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

MR. DAVID BERNSEN: I didn't know if you had a

1 question. 2 THE COURT: I'm good for right now. Thank you. 3 All right, Document 133, Little League Baseball's Motion to Quash Third Party of Praesidium. 4 5 I don't know if I'm pronouncing that correctly or not. 6 MR. FOX: I believe it's Praesidium, Your 7 Honor. 8 THE COURT: Praesidium, okay. 9 Let's just pinpoint, before we get too far afield, what day did Little League Baseball, if at all, 10 engage Praesidium to be a consulting expert? 11 The date is in October of 2022. 12 MR. FOX: Ι 13 don't remember the exact date. It might have been the 14 22nd. 15 Okay. So do you have any THE COURT: 16 objection to producing these requested documents of 17 Praesidium prior to them being engaged as a consulting 18 expert? 19 We still do, Your Honor, and that's MR. FOX: 20 because we believe the standard under Rule 26 includes 2.1 the period of time in which we had not yet formally 22 engaged them, but were speaking with them in 23 anticipation of the litigation. 24 THE COURT: All right, so you got the 25 retention letter from the Bernsens on January of 2022.

So do you have any objections to producing the 1 2 documents prior to January of 2022? 3 MR. FOX: No. THE COURT: All right. So let me hear from 4 5 the plaintiffs what y'all want, or not -- I don't 6 know -- of documents after January of 2022. 7 MR. CADE BERNSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 8 Okay, you can explain that to me. THE COURT: 9 MR. CADE BERNSEN: First, I'm sorry for 10 speaking out earlier. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. CADE BERNSEN: Just too much caffeine, I 13 apologize. 14 That's all right. THE COURT: 15 MR. CADE BERNSEN: Okay. Judge, I feel 16 passionate about this. I know time is of the essence, 17 but it's like when you hire, because we've hired many, 18 many experts. And you have, too, when you were 19 practicing. You're a great attorney. And your dad is, 20 too. You know, you get into a case, you hire an 2.1 The lawyer hires the expert. In this case expert. 22 it's their client -- anyway, you hire an expert, you 2.3 decide whether they are going to be a consulting expert or a testifying expert. 24 25 In this case, what we know is that the

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corporate rep testifies without objection, without mention -- in fact, they file those errata sheets that you are familiar with. They didn't try to change it then. And he testified -- and what I've come to find out in this case, in this industry, is that it is a common practice, Praesidium and then the other one will come in, too, Players Health, I assume. It is common for youth organizations to hire these two specific companies to analyze their child protection program. That's what they do. They come in there and they say this is where you're weak, this is where you're strong. How can we make it better? And that's what they do in the ongoing ordinary course of business, not as experts in litigation. So my dad is asking the corporate rep, what do y'all do? Because Little League wholly fails to do any kind of monitoring of its own program. at the end of the deposition my dad is like "Do y'all to talk to any third parties about this?" And he's like, "Oh, yeah, we did. know, starting in 2020 and 2021 we start talking with Praesidium and Players Health." And Judge, out of the 30,000 -- may I approach? THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. CADE BERNSEN: Out of the 30,000 and some odd documents that they produced, we find this one document, which is Bates labeled LLB031928, from Praesidium to Samantha Mehaffy, who's their security director that we think they didn't treat too fairly, sent October 5, 2021, which, of course, is before Isaacks' arrest. And it totally corroborates Stahlnecker's testimony that they are, in fact, communicating with Praesidium in the ordinary course of business way prior to his arrest and way prior to any anticipation of litigation. So we take his depo. He mentions, oh, yeah, we're working with them. You know, we're working with -- and then they try to say, well, it was just discussions or whatever. They are talking to them way before the arrest. And so then -- so, yes, so to me the whole thing -- so, basically, we take his depo, they panic. And then a month after his depo they say, "Oh, yeah, he's our consulting expert." And to us, frankly, it is a sham. an attempt to -- and it's not that lawyers had hired It's literally Little League that supposedly did

think that they are trying to basically cloak and cover

it without their trial counsel doing it. And so we

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up all their communications with Praesidium that could be very relevant to the case. And it's not just -- we certainly want up until January of 2022, but everything from January through October, they can't get us a precise date, which is over a month after, sounds like you said October 22nd. I think that's literally about a month after the deposition. We want everything up to the date they supposedly, you know, hired them as a consulting expert.

And then, honestly, Judge, we want everything to the present day, because it's not fair and people can take advantage of this. It's like they have this ongoing business relationship with Praesidium and there could be some bad things in there that they don't -- embarrassing things, because there has been a lot of damming evidence that's come out against Little League.

So, after the deposition and it came out of his mouth, they are trying to cover it by saying, "Oh, yeah, yeah, he's a consulting expert."

And we think it reeks of bad faith, it reeks of gamesmanship, and we don't believe it.

So one opportunity could be we think we're certainly entitled to everything up until October 2022. And if they want to play that game and say that,

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then from October -- from the day they say he's consulting, Praesidium, from that date to present, then you could do an in-camera inspection and we would, I quess, be comfortable with that. But we certainly think -- I mean, we would like it all the way to the present because we think the whole thing is a farce. Respectfully, I mean, we do. THE COURT: Respectfully? MR. CADE BERNSEN: Respectfully. THE COURT: With all due respect? With all due respect. MR. CADE BERNSEN: THE COURT: Here's what I'm going to rule. I'll grant the Motion to Quash to the extent it applies to anything on or after -- when did you receive -- when did Little League get the retention letter from Bernsen? January something? 18th, maybe. MR. DAVID BERNSEN: Yes. THE COURT: January 18th. MR. DAVID BERNSEN: Don't hold me to that. MR. FOX: I think it was January 19. Sir? THE COURT: January 19, okay. MR. FOX: 19th. THE COURT: I'll deny the motion to protection for anything that applies to prior January 19th of 2022. Anything after that, I'll inspect in-camera to

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review whether there is a consulting privilege -- or excuse me, whether Praesidium meets the standards for consulting expert, whether they were retained as a consulting expert, things of that nature. And then I'll just review it in-camera and make that determination.

I will say, Mr. Fox -- and you can talk to your clients and the other lawyers that are handling this case -- you better be real sure that you can meet the standard for consulting expert. Because once I start going through all those document and it doesn't meet the standard -- and I'm not saying you have. But if you say, no, they are a consulting expert, you can't have it, it's not going to go over well; okay?

So make sure you can meet that standard.

If there is any question at all about it, it might
behoove Little League to just go ahead and produce that
information and withdraw that objection. But I'll just
wait to see it.

Okay, here's the complicating factor, though. This is a third-party subpoena, I think, to Praesidium, so it's directed towards them. So how am I going to tell Praesidium what to produce and not produce?

MR. CADE BERNSEN: One recommendation -- may I

1 sit here to answer this? 2 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. CADE BERNSEN: 3 One recommendation I would say is to have them produce the entire subpoena to the 4 5 Court and then y'all could give us everything that 6 starts -- you know, I think that would be the easiest 7 way to do it, everything before January 2022. however you want to do it. 8 9 What's your second suggestion? THE COURT: 10 MR. CADE BERNSEN: Give us all the documents. 11 We'll determine what is the in-camera inspection for 12 you and give it to you. 13 THE COURT: What's the third? 14 All right, okay, I'm just -- every time I 15 review something in-camera, discovery-wise, I always 16 say, this is the last time I'm going to do this. 17 screw myself every single time when I recommit to doing 18 it again. It's necessary in this case. So I'm sure 19 I'll regret my decision to do an in-camera inspection 20 once I start getting into it, if there is a lot of 2.1 Maybe there is not, I don't know. information. 22 But I will just enter an order for 2.3 Praesidium to give it all to me and I'll inspect it in-camera and then I'll provide anything prior to 24 25 January 23rd of 2022 to the parties' counsel or

1 And then after that, I'll make a 2 determination of consulting privilege and then kind of 3 go from there. I still have an issue with how it's going 4 5 to be -- you know, the returns or the execution. Are you going to resubmit the deposition by written 6 7 questions to Praesidium, just to say "Delivered to Judge Hawthorn" or --8 9 MR. DAVID BERNSEN: We can do that, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Okay, just try that and we'll see 11 what happens. 12 Anything on that, Mr. Fox? 13 MR. FOX: How are we supposed to get back? 14 THE COURT: Well, so this is a -- is the 15 discovery request directed towards Praesidium or Little 16 League Baseball? 17 Praesidium. MR. FOX: 18 THE COURT: Okay, Praesidium. So you are moving for protection for this subpoena or deposition 19 20 by written question to Praesidium; they are not 21 requesting documents from you necessarily. 22 So here's what I'm getting at. I don't 2.3 know if you really necessarily need to get back to me, unless Praesidium is going to give you all the 24 25 documents and you're going to give all the documents to

1 Like I don't -- what's your role in this is what 2 I'm trying to ask? 3 MR. FOX: The reason that I asked -- and I'll 4 preface this by saying we have a similar overbreadth 5 objection, like the other ones that we've talked about 6 in addition to this claim of privilege. 7 claiming privilege. We believe that we are entitled to 8 that protection; we are entitled to keep these documents 9 from being produced to anybody because of the privilege. 10 THE COURT: But not the documents before you 11 knew you were going to get sued; correct? 12 MR. FOX: Correct. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 I'm referring to the documents on MR. FOX: 15 the other side of --16 THE COURT: Right, right. That's going to 17 come to me. 18 MR. FOX: Okay. 19 And I'm going to make an in-camera THE COURT: 20 inspection of it to evaluate whether the consulting 21 privilege is real and when did it occur. 22 MR. FOX: Okay. 23 THE COURT: To the best of my ability. I think there is no consulting privilege or it happened 24 on a certain date, then I'll make that determination

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and then I'll disclose the relevant documents to the other side. Of course, I'll hold off on it for a little while to give y'all an opportunity to object or whatever before I give it to the other side. Anyways, what was your question again? I think that you've answered it. Okay, all right, very good. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. FOX: All right, the last one is Motion THE COURT: for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Facially Overbroad Subpoena to Players Health. You can go ahead, Mr. Fox. I looked at this. I really think that the parties can agree to -y'all are pretty close on what you can and can't get, or what you want. So it appears that -- help me out, Mr. Fox -- that Little League is saying, yes, you are entitled to Players Health documents when it comes to sexual assault or sexual abuse and things of that nature, but it's overbroad otherwise. So let me get it from you? What's your objection to this? MR. FOX: I think that you have articulated the objection.

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THE COURT:

Without giving the store away,

1 what else is Players Health doing for Little League 2 Baseball that doesn't regard child safety? 3 MR. FOX: So the answer is other things that 4 involve child safety, but outside the realm of sexual 5 abuse of children. 6 THE COURT: Like just injuries, like head 7 injuries or something like that? 8 MR. FOX: Sure. And also things related to 9 disputes that parents may have with local leagues. I 10 don't know if you've experienced --11 Wait, parents have disputes with THE COURT: 12 Little League? 13 MR. FOX: Local leagues. 14 THE COURT: I'm shocked. 15 Regarding the sports aspect of the MR. FOX: 16 game, who can play on what team, rule disputes. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Things of that nature. 18 MR. FOX: 19 THE COURT: Can y'all come to some kind of 20 agreement on this? I mean, Mr. Bernsen, Cade Bernsen? 21 We can try, yes, Your Honor. MR. CADE BERNSEN: 22 THE COURT: So what they are saying is y'all 2.3 can -- you can get the documents as it relates to child 24 safety, but I guess Players Health does a lot of other 25 consulting or functions for Little League Baseball

1 other than that. 2 MR. FOX: So it --3 THE COURT: Sorry, go ahead, Mr. Fox. 4 MR. FOX: If I may correct one thing that you 5 said, Judge. So there are multiple buckets within 6 child safety. Child safety from Players Health 7 perspective, from Little League's perspective, encompasses things other than the prevention of sexual 8 abuse. It also pertains to just other safety risks of 9 10 the sport. 11 And then even in addition to that, 12 there is this dynamic of parents having disputes with 13 leagues about the rules of the game and who can be on 14 what team and things like that. We think that that 15 stuff is outside the permissible scope of discovery. 16 We think that the things pertaining to the prevention 17 of sexual abuse of children is within the permissible 18 scope of discovery. 19 THE COURT: Mr. Cade Bernsen? MR. CADE BERNSEN: Your Honor, we think it's 20 2.1 absolutely -- first, they said it's overbroad and they 22 said -- you know, we asked for five years and Judge 2.3 Truncale already said 10 years is not overbroad in this case, so that's out. 24 25 How they handle other injuries is

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important. For instance, in one of the handbooks we've come across they have this whole concussion education program where at the beginning of each season they make the parents sign -- this is in Concord Little League, which is the model ASAP plan that won the national award for Little League. And there is a document in there and it talks about: Here are the warning signs of a concussion. Please read this. Here's where the parent signs, here's where the kid signs.

So how they handle other injuries is absolutely relevant.

THE COURT: And I think they are agreeing to that, child safety. Child safety. What he's talking about is how to deal with crazy parents that are, "Why is my son not playing on this team?"

MR. CADE BERNSEN: Okay, yes, Your Honor, I'm sorry, I thought he was trying to make a distinction between -- okay, we just wanted all child safety as it relates to anything child safety.

Plus, Your Honor has pointed one thing.

We just took a second round of depositions in

Williamsport and their Vice-president of Marketing

Communications, Liz Brown, said that Players Health

actually came on campus with a full delegation of

people and made a presentation to Little League

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executives as to this is what we're offering, this is what we can do for you. And that's what Mahaffey was saying, "Show me how to get abuse awareness training into my program." And so we obviously want anything to do with those presentations.

Surprisingly enough, the corporate counsel for this company lives in Katy, Texas and she called us and was a really nice lady, and she was like, "We don't have a problem complying with this. We're just waiting -- you know, we're waiting for the Court's instructions on this." Very nice lady. And it's weird because Players Health is out of Minnesota and their general counsel lives in Katy, Texas.

Anyway, we would certainly want anything to do with players safety, regardless if it's sexual abuse. Anything player safety, and then those presentations that were given in Williamsport. If that's fine with you, then we can work it out.

MR. FOX: So, to be clear about my position, it was that within child safety, we contend that the things about the sexual abuse prevention are within the permissible scope of discovery, and then the other aspects of child safety are not.

THE COURT: No, it's my contention that they are. So I'll let you -- I'll grant the Motion to Quash

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as it pertains to things that are not related to child And child safety includes, but is not limited to injuries, concussions, emotional injury, sexual abuse. I do think that it's relevant to show and I've seen this before. You know, their argument may be, hey, they do all these things to prevent concussions, but they don't one lick of anything to prevent sexual assaults. I'm not saying that's true or not, but that's what they are trying to get at. So I think that is relevant. So I'll grant the protection to the subpoena only as regards to things that don't relate to child safety, and child safety is not just sexual abuse. It's, you know, physical, mental or emotional injuries. MR. FOX: Understood. THE COURT: I don't care about the disputes of the parents. MR. CADE BERNSEN: And, Your Honor, one thing,

on these last two, does that include the presentations they did in Williamsport?

If they regarded child safety, THE COURT: you're going to get it.

MR. CADE BERNSEN: And one other thing, Your On these last two things, Marianne, who's smarter than I am, she said what about a time frame for

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these last two --THE COURT: I think Judge Truncale read the transcript from the latest hearing, or one of the latest hearings she had with Judge Truncale, and he said 10 years is standard. MR. FOX: We did not take an issue with the time frame. THE COURT: Okav. MR. CADE BERNSEN: The time frame about which we get this stuff completed. THE COURT: Right, okay, we'll talk about that now, I quess. It's going to be a little bit before I do written orders on these motions, and they are going to be brief. But I'm just going to tell you right now, I'm going to deny Motion to Quash subpoenas, Document No. 76 and Document No. 93. Again, these are third-party subpoenas. So, I mean, I'm not going to call Keystone Risk managers and tell them when to produce it, but that's up to y'all to get it. If you want it, you go get it. I'm denying the Motion of the Protective Order. Just to rehash, the Motion to Strike the Defendants' Confidentiality Designations -- that's

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Docket Entries 95, 98, and 102 -- are all denied.

1 Plaintiff's Motion to Unseal First Amended 2 Complaint, Document No. 112, is granted. 3 The Motion to Quash Third-party Subpoena 4 to Praesidium is granted in part. It's denied to the 5 extent that it pertains to information prior to January 6 23rd of 2022. It's granted to the extent that anything 7 after that date needs to be submitted to the Court for 8 in-camera review. 9 Document No. 154 will be granted in part. It's granted only to the extent that the request 10 11 pertain to information that is not related to player 12 And I'm not going to verbally give the metes 13 and bounds of what player safety is, but I'm just going 14 to say it's something like anything having to do with 15 the players' mental, physical, or emotional health. 16 Anything else further from plaintiffs? 17 No, Your Honor, thank you. MR. DAVID BERNSEN: 18 THE COURT: You're welcome. 19 Anything else further from the defense? 20 Mr. Fox? 21 No, Judge. MR. FOX: 22 THE COURT: Mr. Adams? 2.3 MR. ADAMS: No, Your Honor, but it's the 24 grandparents that are the most troublesome. 25 They can be. They can be. THE COURT:

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So, going forward, too, just to remind you, because this might get lost in the wilderness, when you file a motion that contains an exhibit with something that's been designated as confidential, according to the Protective Order, you've got to file it under seal, but you need to accompany that with a motion to either seal or unseal. You know, I don't know which way you are on the fence depending on who's filing it. So the other side has an opportunity to respond. And then the standard as far as I'm concerned is the Binh Hoa Le standard.

But the plaintiffs know what my feelings are on the current Protective Order. It's too broad, it encompasses everything. And if you squawk about them designating something confidential, that's on you. You're the ones that agreed to it.

excuse me, the Protective Order needs to be amended because it's being used in bad faith or nefarious purposes, then get with the other side to try to come up with some qualifying languages to make it more specific, more limiting. And if you can't come to an agreement, file a motion with the Court and we'll take it up.

All right, we're adjourned on this.

[1:40 p.m. - Proceedings adjourned]

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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause.

/s/ Ed Reed
Edward L. Reed
Court Reporter

 $\frac{3-9-23}{\text{Date}}$